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Hanam S. Phang, Korea Labour Institute 
 
 
 The demographic transition in the Republic of Korea has been extremely rapid. It will turn one of the 
youngest populations in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) into one 
of the oldest by the middle of the twenty-first century (OECD, 2002), unless policy intervention and 
demographic behavioural change significantly alter the present course. 
 
 In less than half a century, the fertility and mortality regimes in the Republic of Korea have changed 
from the typical developing-country pattern to one characteristic of developed countries. The 
demographic transition began immediately after the Korean War in the early 1950s, when fertility rates 
were still very high. Official records indicate that the size of the baby-boom cohort born during the 1950s 
was around 8 million. This baby-boom generation and its offspring “echo generation” have a powerful 
“population momentum” that will largely shape the demography of the Korean population through the 
mid-twenty first century and beyond. The story of Korea’s rapidly declining fertility followed by rapid 
population ageing revolves around the members of the baby-boom cohort – their demographics, culture, 
attitudes, behaviour as adults, and ultimately, their retirement from the labour force. 
 
 As the large baby-boom generation enters old age and life expectancy continues to increase, the age 
structure of the Korean population will change radically in the coming decades. Soon, the Republic of 
Korea will be facing the issues of a rapidly ageing population and decreasing labour force that are typical 
of developed countries. The “demographic dividend” that has benefited the Korean economy is expected 
to turn into a “demographic debt”, as the baby-boom cohort claims its credit back from younger 
generations. This changeover from demographic dividend to debt raises serious issues of intergenerational 
equity with respect to economic growth and welfare distribution. During the first part of the twenty-first 
century, pension and health costs of retirees from the baby-boom generation will exert an unsustainable 
pressure on the social security system and the economy in general, at a time when the labour force will be 
relatively small. 
 
 The present paper describes the major patterns of the past demographic transition in Korea and 
discusses the future trends of the Korean population. In particular, it examines how and to what extent the 
Korean economy benefited from the demographic dividend generated by the demographic transition and 
evaluates the assumptions regarding future fertility rates in the population projections of the Korea 
National Statistical Office (KNSO) and the United Nations Population Division. In addition, the paper 
addresses some policy initiatives that might mitigate the possible adverse repercussions of population 
ageing in order to keep Korea’s economic growth and development on a sustainable path.  
 
A.  DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, 1950-2000 
 
 Demographic transition in Korea has been characterized by a rapid decline in fertility and a consistent 
and more gradual decrease in mortality. Figure 1 shows trends in crude birth (CBR) and death rates and 
total fertility rate (TFR) over the period 1950-2000. The CBR peaked at about 45 per thousand in 1955-
1960 and decreased to 14 in 1995-2000. By the 1950s, improvement in public health and hygiene had 
already lowered the crude death rate (CDR) from about 35 per thousand in 1910 to about 17 per thousand 
in 1950-1955, and had increased life expectancy at birth from about 23 years in 1905-1910 to about 50 
years in 1950-1955 (T.H. Kim, 2004). The CDR decreased further to 6 per thousand in 1995-2000. 
Following the implementation of an aggressive Government campaign for family planning, the TFR 
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declined dramatically, from 5.0-6.0 children per woman during the 1950s and 1960s to 1.7 in the mid-
1980s.1 This decrease of more than 3 children per woman in a period of about 2 decades has rarely been 
matched in world demographic history (Kwon, 1997). The fertility rate continued to fall into the 1990s 
and recently hit a record low of 1.2 in 2002 and 2003. 
 
 
Figure 1. Crude death rate (CDR), crude birth rate (CBR) and total fertility rate (TFR),  
Republic of Korea, 1950-2000 
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Source: United Nations (2005). 
 
 
 In half a century, the Korean population increased by a factor of 2.5 from about 19 million in 1950 to 
47 million in 2000.  The population growth rate peaked at 3.1 per cent per year in 1960 and then declined 
rapidly, reaching 1.0 per cent in the mid-1980s (figure 2). Until the mid-1970s, Korea’s fertility pattern 
was similar to the average in the less developed regions. Thereafter, Korea’s TFR swiftly converged to 
the level observed in the more developed regions (figure 3). The consistent decline of TFR results from 
the overlapping of childbearing patterns in different cohorts. For women born in 1950, the completed 
fertility rate was 2.9 children per woman. The 1970 cohort was the first to attain significantly below-
replacement fertility, with 1.7 children per woman. The completed fertility rates of the 1970 through 1985 
cohorts are of particular importance, as they will determine the TFR of the early twenty-first century in 
Korea. Based on observed and projected data, the completed fertility rates of the 1975, 1980 and 1985 
cohorts will be about 1.5, 1.4 and 1.3 respectively, which implies the prevalence of well below-
replacement fertility levels throughout the period 2000-2025 (table 1). 
 
 The demographic transition in Korea took place in the midst of rapid economic development and the 
transformation of the socio-economic system from a rural agrarian to an urban industrialized society 
(Doo-Sub Kim, 2004). The steep and consistent decline in fertility during 1950-1985 can be viewed as an 
outcome of socio-economic change at the macro-level, operating through choices made at the household 
(micro) level. The convergence of Korea’s TFR to that of more developed countries after the mid-1980s 
may have been dictated by parents’ rational choice based on the cost-benefit calculation of bearing and 
rearing children and parents’ aspirations for upgrading the standard of living at the micro-level (Doo-Sub 
Kim, 2004). Parents began investing in the quality rather than the quantity of their children. Investment in 
children as human capital can be understood as a rational choice given the high returns to education made 
possible by Korea’s growing economy and modernizing society (Becker, Murphy and Tamura, 1990).  
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Figure 2. Population size and growth rate, Republic of Korea, 1950-2000 
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Source: Korea National Statistical Office (http://kosis.nso.go.kr); United Nations (2005) for 1950 and 1955. 
NOTE: Earliest two points refer respectively to the periods 1950-1955 and 1955-1960. 
 
 
Figure 3. Total fertility rate in Japan, Republic of Korea and development regions, 1950-2000 
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Source: United Nations (2005). 
 
 
TABLE 1:  COHORT COMPLETED FERTILITY RATES IN REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
Cohort 
Prime childbirth period  
(Age 25-40) Completed fertility rate 
1950 1975-1990 2.87 
1955 1980-1995 2.27 
1960 1985-2000 2.08 
1965 1990-2005 1.98 
1970 1995-2010 1.70 
1975 2000-2015 1.49 
1980 2005-2020 1.39 
1985 2010-2025 1.32 
 
Source: KNSO (2003).   
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 The changing fertility regime has been realized both through an increasing proportion of young men 
and women in their 20s remaining unmarried and through lower marital fertility. For instance, figure 4 
shows a conspicuous decline in marriage rates among women aged up to 25 and men aged up to 30 during 
the period 1970-2004. In contrast, but to a lesser extent, marriage rates of men and women aged 30 and 
over have gradually been increasing over that period. As shown in table 2, the average age at first 
marriage has consistently increased over recent decades. In 1972, it was 22.6 years for women and 26.7 
for men. As of 2004, it had increased to 27.5 years for women and 30.6 for men. Delayed marriage means 
a shortened period for women to bear children. Thus, unless age-specific marital fertility rises, the total 
fertility rate is expected to decline. 
 
 In fact, some social surveys indicate that the young generation may not be giving up marriage for 
good but just delaying it for their work careers (Byun, 2004). The discrimination against married women 
that is characteristic of the traditional male-dominated corporate culture in Korea has been a major barrier 
so far to the extension of female labour force participation. The current trend of delayed marriage among 
young women reflects their behavioural adaptation to this situation in the job market. 
 
 Although the trend towards later marriage might have a negative effect on future fertility levels, it 
could also have a positive effect on the Korean labour force and economic growth, by increasing the 
workforce's proportion of highly educated women who can remain attached to their careers for a longer 
period. On the other hand, getting married late does not necessarily mean a reduced number of children. 
The young generation might catch up since, even with marriage occurring so late, most couples would be 
physically able to have several children if they chose.  
 
 
Figure 4. Age-specific marriage rates by sex, Republic of Korea, 1970-2004 
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TABLE 2:  AVERAGE AGE AT FIRST MARRIAGE BY SEX  
IN REPUBLIC OF KOREA, 1972-2004 
 
 1972 1975 1981 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003 2004 
          
Male 26.7 26.8 26.4 27.0 27.8 28.4 29.3 30.1 30.6 
Female 22.6 22.8 23.2 24.1 24.8 25.4 26.5 27.3 27.5 
Source: KNSO (2003). 
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B.  DEMOGRAPHIC DIVIDEND AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
 The “demographic dividend” refers to the opportunity for economic growth brought about by the 
increasing proportion of the working-age population during the demographic transition. According to 
Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2002), while population growth has a negative effect on per capita income 
(other things being equal), this effect is counteracted by the positive effect of the growth of the 
economically active population. They argue that the demographic dividend was essential to East Asia’s 
“economic miracle”. Mason (2001) presents a counter-argument by proposing a reverse causal 
mechanism. Rapid economic development and the accompanying social change (modernization, 
urbanization, and changes in behaviour), might have induced or facilitated demographic transition. 
However, when the two processes (economic development and demographic change) take place almost 
simultaneously in a relatively short period of time, it may be futile to try to apportion the causal flows 
precisely.  
 
 Leaving aside the issue of the cause of the initial economic and demographic changes, once change 
began, the demographic transition and economic growth in Korea epitomize the “demographic dividend” 
as described by Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2002). In Korea’s demographic transition, mortality decline 
preceded the fertility decline.  The lag between the two generated a “bulge” in the number of births and 
population growth, the baby-boom generation.  The baby-boomers grew up to form a large and young 
labour force, which contributed to an unprecedented economic growth.  Bloom, Canning and Sevilla 
estimated that the dividend could explain one-third of the region’s economic growth. Rapid socio-
economic modernization and development led to rapid changes in the generation’s fertility behaviour, 
which led to a rapid decrease in fertility levels.  In turn, the decline in fertility reinforced the economic 
growth by lowering the dependency and welfare burden and allowing for higher investment in human 
capital.  
 
 However, as stressed by Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2002), the demographic dividend is not 
automatic.  If timely policy initiatives are not adopted and correctly applied, the opportunity could be 
missed. Conversely, if a sound policy environment is put in place, then the population dividend will be 
delivered through enhanced labour supply, savings and human capital. The following sections illustrate 
how the Republic of Korea benefited from the demographic dividend. 
 
Population growth and labour force 
 
 Over the second half of the twentieth century the Korean population increased at an average rate of 
1.8 per cent per year, from about 19 million in 1950 to 47 million in 2000 (table 3). During the first phase 
of the demographic transition (1950-1975), the average growth rate of the population (2.5 per cent per 
year) was significantly higher than the 1.1 per cent observed during the second phase of the transition 
(1975-2000). The proportion of the population in the working ages (15-64 years) remained relatively 
stable at around 55 per cent during the initial phase of the transition but started increasing in the mid-
1970s to reach more than 70 per cent in 2000 (table 3). This outcome resulted not only from the large 
baby-boom cohort born at the onset of the fertility transition (1950-1960) but also from the relatively 
large number of the baby-boomers’ descendents, the “echo cohort”; that is, the large number of baby-
boomers led to a temporary resurgence of births even though fertility rates had already started declining 
by the time the baby-boomers reached the reproductive ages. 
 
 The total dependency ratio was relatively high between 1950 and 1975, due to the high youth 
dependency ratio resulting from the high levels of fertility. At that time, the old-age dependency ratio was 
low. Until the mid-1980s, those aged 65 or over made up less than 4 per cent of the population. Starting in 
the mid-1970s, however, the total dependency ratio declined rapidly—to reach a level below that of the 
more developed countries by the mid-1980s, when the Korean economy was entering a more mature stage 
 124
of economic development. At the same time, the median age of the Korean population, which had 
remained between 19 and 20 years from 1950 to 1975, jumped to about 22 years in 1980, 27 years in 
1990 and 32 years in 2000 (table 3). 
 
 These changes in population size and age structure certainly contributed to economic growth by 
supplying a growing and young labour force to the economy. Demographic transition may also have 
contributed to economic growth by providing women an increased opportunity to participate in the labour 
market. Women became more likely to enter the workforce in great part because of the smaller number of 
children to take care of. According to national statistics, labour force participation of women of 
childbearing age has increased consistently. Especially impressive was the increase in the labour force 
participation rate of women aged 20-29, from below 45 per cent in 1980 to almost 65 per cent in 2004. 
Women still remain a promising source of the future labour force as younger cohorts become more 
educated, more inclined to participate, and more attached to their own work career through postponed 
marriage. Their increasing labour force participation is expected to add to labour supply, reinforcing the 
effect of the demographic dividend. 
 
Population growth and savings rate 
 
 According to Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2002), demographic transition also contributes to 
economic growth by increasing savings, which improves a country’s prospects for investment and 
growth. The young and old consume more than they produce, whereas the working-age population tends 
to have both a higher level of economic output and a higher level of savings (Higgins, 1998). Improved 
health and longevity make saving easier and more attractive: a healthy population must plan far in 
advance if it is to maintain its standard of living through decades of retirement (Lee, Mason and Miller, 
2000). Thus, as baby-boomers reach middle age (their 40s and 50s) national savings are expected to rise 
and contribute to capital accumulation, provided that savings are invested into productive activities. 
 
Demographic transition and investment in human capital 
 
 The demographic transition may have also a significant effect on investment in human capital. 
Decreased mortality and improved health cause parents to invest more in their children’s human capital, 
as the wage premium for higher education increases and lower mortality means that the benefits last 
 
TABLE 3:  DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES IN REPUBLIC OF KOREA, 1950-2000 
 
Year 
Population 
(thousand) 
Percentage     
15-64 
Population 
growth 
(percentage) 
Median age 
(years) 
Dependency 
ratio 
1950 18 859 55 2.6 19 81 
1955 21 422 57 3.1 20 76 
1960 25 003 55 2.6 19 83 
1965 28 530 53 2.3 19 87 
1970 31 922 54 2.0 19 83 
1975 35 281 58 1.6 20 71 
1980 38 124 62 1.4 22 61 
1985 40 806 66 1.0 25 52 
1990 42 869 69 1.0 27 45 
1995 45 007 71 0.8 29 41 
2000 46 779 72 0.4 32 40 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office (http://kosis.nso.go.kr); United Nations (2005).  
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Figure 5. National savings and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates,  
Republic of Korea, 1971-2004 
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Source: Korea National Statistical Office (http://kosis.nso.go.kr). 
NOTE: Rates are 3-year moving averages. 
 
 
Figure 6. Education level and population, labour force and GDP growth rates,  
Republic of Korea, 1971-2004 
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Source: Korea National Statistical Office (http://kosis.nso.go.kr). 
NOTE: The GDP growth rates are 3-year moving averages. 
 
 
longer. With fewer children, it becomes easier to devote more time and money to each child. As a result, 
the labour force becomes more productive, in turn promoting higher wages and better standard of living. 
 
 Figure 6 shows the trends in population, labour force and GDP growth rates along with the average 
educational level of the population. An examination of the long-term trend lines for these rates shows that 
the GDP growth rate moves in closer parallel with the growth rate of the labour force than with the total 
population. The trend in GDP growth lags that in growth of the labour force by about 10 years. The 
growth rate of the labour force peaked in 1977 at 3.3 per cent and then decreased, while the growth rate of 
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GDP peaked in 1987 at about 11.0 per cent and decreased thereafter. Particularly noteworthy is the 
parallel trend in the decreasing growth rates of the labour force and the GDP since the late 1980s.  
 
 From 1971 to 2003, the educational level of the population increased linearly from an average of less 
than 6 years of study to almost 12 years. According to Lee (1997), the miracle economic growth of Korea 
could be attributed to the rapid growth of human capital stock at least for the first 3 decades (1960s-
1980s) of its economic development. Since the late 1980s, the economic growth rate has consistently 
fallen while the level of educational attainment has continued to increase. According to D.I. Kim (2004), 
while the supply of the college-educated labour force consistently rose over the past decades, its quality 
deteriorated after the start of the rapid yet unregulated expansion of college education. This implies a 
falling rate of return to investment in education due either to oversupply of highly educated labour or to 
declining quality of college education, as is documented in recent analyses of the Korean labour market 
(Lee and others, 2005). Thus, part of the falling rate of economic growth since the late 1980s may be 
explained by the deteriorating quality of the human capital among new entrants to the labour force as well 
as by the decreasing population growth rate. 
 
 In summary, the demographic changes in Korea have produced a demographic dividend, spurring 
economic growth during the second half of the twentieth century in the context of a favourable policy 
environment.2 However, there remains the question of what will happen to the population and labour 
force in the coming decades of the twenty-first century. Even though fertility has already fallen to a level 
far below that needed for replacement of successive generations, the Korean population is projected to 
continue growing until 2020, when the baby-boom and its ”echo generation” will have passed through 
their reproductive ages. After that, a period of negative growth is expected to begin. Thus, the population 
momentum created by the baby-boom cohort at the beginning of the demographic transition will last 
about 70 years, after which the Korean population is projected to grow older at full speed. 
 
C.  KOREAN POPULATION IN THE FUTURE: PROJECTIONS OF THE KOREAN  
NATIONAL STATISTICAL OFFICE AND THE UNITED NATIONS 
 
 The future of Korean population ageing, labour force, economic growth and the social welfare system 
depend critically on the course of fertility change. The critical question is whether fertility will stay at the 
current below-replacement level or will rise as many policy-makers and optimistic demographers expect. 
In early 2005, the United Nations Population Division issued the 2004 Revision of its estimates and 
projections of population. Also in 2005, the Korean National Statistical Office (KNSO) issued a revised 
version of its original 2001 population projections, which were based on the 2000 census. The reason for 
the 2005 revision was to reflect the radical drop in fertility rate since 2000. The following paragraphs 
compare the population projections and demographic assumptions adopted by KNSO (1996, 2001 and 
2005) and by the United Nations (2005). The major demographic indicators and assumptions adopted in 
each population projection are summarized in table 4. 
 
 Because fertility rates are notoriously hard to predict (Bongaarts, 1998), there is significant variation 
in this variable across projections. In its original projection issued in 2001, KNSO pictured a very smooth 
and stable development of future fertility and assumed a TFR for 2005 of 1.37, which was expected to 
gradually increase to 1.40 by 2030 and to stay at that level until 2050. The observed TFR was 1.47 for 
1998, 1.42 for 1999 and 1.47 for 2000, averaging 1.45 for the period 1998-2000. Thereafter, the TFR 
abruptly dropped to 1.30 in 2001, 1.17 in 2002 and 1.19 in 2003. The decline in TFR during 2001-2003 
prompted KNSO to revise its 2001 decennial projection. The 2005 revision assumed a TFR of 1.19 for 
2005, 1.28 for 2030 and 1.30 for 2050. On the other hand, the 2004 revision of the United Nations 
projection assumed a gradual increase in TFR from 1.21 in 2005 to 1.56 in 2030 and 1.77 in 2050, 
according to the medium variant (table 4). The United Nations also presented low- and high-fertility 
variants, which assumed that TFR after 2010 would be, respectively, one-half child below and one-half 
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child above the levels assumed in the medium variant.  Figure 7 presents the population projections from 
the 2005 KNSO revision (medium-fertility variant) and the 2004 United Nations revision (low-, medium- 
and high-fertility variants). According to the KNSO projection, the Korean population will grow to about 
50 million by 2020 and then decrease to less than 43 million by 2050. This result is similar to the medium 
variant of the United Nations, which projects a slightly larger population of about 45 million for 2050. 
What is most striking, however, is the large difference in the total population resulting from the United 
Nations high- and low-fertility variants. While the high variant projects that the population will increase 
until 2030 and then reach a plateau at around 53 million, the low variant projects a long-term decline from 
the current 48 million to about 37 million by 2050. Thus, depending on the future course of fertility, the 
Korean population could follow completely different courses during the first half of the twenty-first 
century. Considering that past projections have generally over-estimated fertility rates, as was the case 
with Japan (Atoh, 2000), it may be that the future population will be more like that projected by the low 
variant than that by the high variant.  
 
 
TABLE  4.  DEMOGRAPHIC COMPONENTS OF POPULATION PROJECTIONS  
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
 
Korean National  Statistical Office  
Variables Year 1996 2001 2005 
United Nations 
2004 
2005 47 275 48 461 48 294 47 817 
2030 52 744 50 296 49 329 49 161 
Total population 
(thousands) 
2050 - 44 337 42 348 44 629 
2005 1.71 1.37 1.19 1.21 
2030 1.80 1.40 1.28 1.56 
Total fertility rate 
(children per 
woman) 2050 - 1.40 1.30 1.77 
2005 (72.3, 79.7) (74.4, 81.2) (74.8,  81.5) (74.0, 81.0) 
2030 (75.4, 82.5) (78.4, 84.8) (79.2,  85.2) (78.4, 86.4) 
Life expectancy 
(Male, Female) 
(years) 2050 - (80.0, 86.2) (80.7,  86.6) (80.8, 88.5) 
Source: Korean National Statistical Office (http://kosis.nso.go.kr); United Nations (2005).   
 
  
Figure 7.  United Nations (UN) and Korean National Statistical Office (KNSO) 
 population projections, Republic of Korea, 2000-2050 
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Source: Korea National Statistical Office (http://kosis.nso.go.kr); United Nations (2005). 
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 Given the lack of information on which to base predictions about future fertility in Korea, it is useful 
to consider the experience of other countries that went through the demographic transition earlier. In this 
regard, Japan would be the best reference as both countries belong to the same Asian culture of family 
formation and values concerning children. Japan has also been a forerunner of modern demographic 
transition among the East Asian countries. In fact, demographic changes in Japan and Korea during 1950-
2000 have been remarkably similar in their pattern and pace with about a quarter-century time lag (table 5 
and figure 8). The trend lines for Korea are below those for Japan in figure 8, because of the swiftness of 
Korean fertility decline during the 1970s and 1980s, from 2.92 to 1.60. Other than that, the long-term 
trend in both total fertility and population growth rates are approximately parallel for the two countries, 
except for the projected TFR in Korea. While in Japan, after reaching the below-replacement level the 
TFR gradually but consistently decreased to 1.39 in 1995-2000, in Korea the TFR is projected by the 
United Nations to increase to this same level by 2020-2025. Thus, the question is whether the steep  
 
 
TABLE 5:  FERTILITY AND POPULATION GROWTH TRENDS 
 IN JAPAN AND REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
 
Period 
(years)  
Total fertility rate (children 
per women)  
Population growth 
(percentage) 
Japan Korea  Japan Korea   Japan Korea 
1950-1955 1975-1980  2.75 2.92  1.4 1.6 
1955-1960 1980-1985  2.08 2.23  0.9 1.4 
1960-1965 1985-1990  2.02 1.60  1.0 1.0 
1965-1970 1990-1995  2.00 1.70  1.1 1.0 
1970-1975 1995-2000  2.07 1.51  1.3 0.8 
1975-2080 2000-2005  1.81 1.23  0.9 0.4 
1980-2085 2005-2010  1.76 1.21  0.7 0.3 
1985-2090 2010-2015  1.66 1.28  0.4 0.2 
1990-1995 2015-2020  1.49 1.35  0.3 0.1 
1995-2000 2020-2025   1.39 1.42   0.3 0.0 
 
Source: United Nations (2005). 
 
Figure 8.  Trends in total fertility rate (TFR) and population growth rate 
 for Japan and the Republic of Korea in a time-lag framework 
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downward trend of Korean fertility will continue into the first decade of the twenty-first century 
following the Japanese trend observed between 1970 and 2000 or will trend upward to converge to the 
level of Japan for the reference time point. 
 
D.  POPULATION AGEING AND FUTURE LABOUR FORCE 
 
Ageing of the labour force 
 
 Korea is likely to experience one of the fastest demographic transitions from an “ageing” to an “aged” 
society. As a consequence, its work force is also expected to undergo an intense transition. Korea has 
already entered the stage of an ageing society as of 1999, with more than 7 per cent of its population aged 
65 or over. In 2019, Korea is expected to become an aged society with over 14 per cent of its population 
aged 65 or over, which is projected to rise further to 20 per cent by 2026 (KNSO, 2001). This pace of 
transition is extraordinary compared to the past experience of Western societies. For example, France 
took 115 years to move from 7 to 14 per cent aged 65 or over, while the United States took 75 years (table 
6). Among the industrialized countries, Japan has experienced the fastest transition to an aged society. 
However, Korea is expected to surpass Japan. 
 
 Korea will also experience a rapid increase in the old-age dependency ratio, from below 40 people in 
dependent ages (under age 15 and 65 years or over) per hundred working-age people (ages 15-64) in 2000 
to about 82 dependent-age people per hundred of working age in 2050 (table 7). As has occurred in many 
other countries, the dependency ratio is shifting from a predominance of young- to old-age dependency as 
the demographic transition proceeds (Mirkin and Weinberger, 2000).  
 
 As the median age of the population rises from 32 years in 2000 to a projected 43 years in 2020 and 
54 years in 2050 (table 7), the labour force will also get older. For instance, the proportion of workers 
aged 50 and over among the total labour force is projected to increase from about 25 per cent in 2000 to 
more than 50 per cent by 2050 (Phang, 2004). As observed from the past experience of advanced 
countries, increasing old-age dependency and ageing of the labour force usually happen hand in hand, 
which might exacerbate the negative effects on the economy and society. 
 
Labour force participation at older ages 
 
 The future size of the labour force will depend not only on demographic change but also on age-
specific participation rates. The trend in participation rates at higher ages will be particularly important 
given that the older age groups will be growing significantly in both relative and absolute size (OECD, 
2002). Currently, the participation rates of those aged 25-49 years in Korea are lower than the average 
rates for the European Union (EU) and the OECD countries, particularly among women. Conversely, the 
participation rates of men and specially women aged 50-64 years are higher in Korea than in the OECD 
and EU member-countries, although they are significantly lower than in Japan (table 8). 
 
 Thus, older persons in Korea tend to remain in the labour market in higher proportions than do those 
in Western industrialized countries, which makes the Korean pattern resemble that of Japan more than 
that of EU or OECD member countries. This, in turn, implies a possibility that the future pattern of labour 
force participation and withdrawal of the Korean older population might differ from that of advanced 
Western societies, which exhibit a secular trend of early voluntary withdrawal from the labour force 
(Jacobs, Kohli and Rein, 1991).  
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TABLE  6: TRANSITIONS FROM AGING TO AGED SOCIETY IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
 
Year in which proportion of population 
aged 65 or over reaches  
Time (years) for proportion 
to increase from  
Country 
7 per cent 14 per cent 20 per cent   7 to 14       per cent 
14 to 20       
per cent 
Republic of Korea 2000 2019 2026  19 7 
Japan 1970 1994 2006  24 12 
Spain 1942 2013 2028  71 15 
Germany 1932 1972 2012  40 40 
United Kingdom 1929 1976 2021  47 45 
Italy 1927 1988 2007  61 19 
France 1864 1979 2020   115 41 
 
Source: Korean National  Statistical Office: News Release on Population Projections, 2001.  
 
 
TABLE  7: DEPENDENCY RATIOS AND MEDIAN AGE OF POPULATION  
IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, 2000-2050 
 
 
Dependency ratios Year 
Total  Youth a Old age b 
Median age 
(years) 
2000 40 29 10 32 
2010 39 24 15 38 
2020 41 20 21 43 
2030 55 19 36 48 
2040 71 20 52 51 
2050 82 19 63 54 
 
 
Source: Korean National Statistical Office: News Release on Population Projections, 2001. 
a (population aged 0-14)x100 / population aged 15-64. 
b (population aged 65+)x100 / population aged 15-64. 
 
 
TABLE  8: LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES BY AGE AND SEX   
IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, 2000 
(percentage) 
 
Male Female Total 
Countries  25-49 50-64 25-49 50-64 25-49 50-64 
Republic of Korea 92.4 78.0 58.2 50.7 75.5 64.3 
Japan 97.2 89.1 66.1 56.8 81.8 72.6 
European Uniona 94.0 66.1 73.9 42.3 84.0 54.0 
USA 92.4 75.6 77.3 61.0 84.7 68.0 
OECDa  93.7 72.8 69.0 48.4 81.3 60.3 
 
Source: OECD, Labour statistics (http://www.oecd.org/statsportal).   
aAverage.       
 
 
 The high participation rate of the older population in Korea may be attributable, in part, to the 
sizeable self-employed sector, including 40 per cent in agriculture, which is the largest among the OECD 
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member-countries. Among workers aged 55-64, about 60 per cent are classified as self-employed. Among 
those aged 65 or over, 77 per cent of men and 76 per cent of women are self-employed. Since the self-
employed tend to work longer than wage workers, this partially explains the relatively high rate of labour 
force participation of older Koreans. The relatively high participation rate of the older population can help 
alleviate the negative effect of decreasing labour force on economic growth in the coming decades. Thus, 
one of the most important and challenging policy initiatives is to create quality employment opportunities 
for older persons so that they can remain active in the labour market at least until normal retirement age. 
To achieve this, the quality of employment and working conditions of older workers need to be improved.  
 
Future labour force projections 
 
 In a recent study, D. I. Kim (2004) simulated the growth rate of the future labour force according to 
six fertility scenarios. The scenarios varied from one of “very low” fertility, in which a TFR of 1.0 would 
be reached by 2050, to one of “very high” fertility, in which a TFR of 2.1 would be reached by 2050. The 
results indicate that the total labour force would grow to 24.8 million by 2019, and then start decreasing to 
approximately 19 to 17 million in 2050, depending on the target fertility level assumed.  
 
 Figure 9 presents an international comparison of the changes in labour force growth between 1980 
and 2050 under the assumption of constant participation rates at the 2000 levels. Although labour force 
growth will be more rapid in Korea than in most other OECD member countries between 2000 and 2020, 
the slowdown compared with the growth in the previous period (1980-2000) will be especially marked in 
Korea. Japan and the EU may already be experiencing a decline in the absolute size of their labour forces. 
Over the period 2020-2050, the growth of the labour force in Korea will reverse and, along with Japan, 
Korea will experience one of the steepest falls in the size of the labour force. 
 
   
Figure 9: Annual average labour force growth in selected periods between 
1980 and 2050, for selected countries and groups of countries 
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Sources: KNSO (2005); OECD (2002). 
NOTE: The projections of labour force growth over the period 2000-2050 assume that participation 
rates by sex and 5-year age group remain constant at their 2000 levels. 
OECD = members of the Organization for the Economic Cooperation and Development. 
EU = members of the European Union. 
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 In general, however, labour force projections in Korea do not properly take into account the changes 
in participation rates that are expected in the course of population ageing. For instance, social security 
programmes, especially those related to retirement pensions, tend to affect the labour force participation 
of older persons, while higher educational levels and smaller numbers of children could increase the 
participation rates of women. From a policy perspective, it is thus important to consider the possible 
effects of future labour force participation rates. In this respect, it worth noting the projections for the next 
half century of the Korean labour force made by OECD (2002) based on alternative assumptions about 
age-specific participation rates. But this simulation is also limited as no fertility variation is taken into 
account. 
 
 In general, the OECD projections are slightly less pessimistic about the future labour force growth 
than most studies in this area. According to its “maximum participation” scenario, the labour force in 
Korea is projected to reach 24 million in 2050, whereas it does not exceed 20 million in any scenario of 
any other study. In all studies, however, Korea’s labour force is projected to grow at slower rates until 
2020 and then to start shrinking. 
 
E.  THE IMPACT OF AGEING POPULATION ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
 The Korean economy enjoyed a high growth rate of about 7 per cent on average during the last two 
decades. This rapid economic growth was mainly due to the size and quality of labour and capital 
accumulation rather than to increasing growth in total productivity (Hahn and others, 2002). The 
considerable drop in the economic growth rate from 8.3 per cent during the 1980s to 6.0 per cent during 
the 1990s, which was mainly due to the decreasing growth rate of the working population, is indicative of 
the potentially detrimental effects of rapid population ageing on economic growth in the coming decades. 
 
 There is still more debate than consensus among researchers regarding the effect of population ageing 
on economic growth. According to the pessimistic view, upheld by the majority of scholars (Bloom, 
Canning and Sevilla, 2002; Borsch-Supan, 2000; OECD, 1998; World Bank, 1994), population ageing 
driven by low fertility and longer life expectancy has negative effects on economic growth through a set 
of inter-related mechanisms: (i) decreasing labour input due to low population growth and ageing; (ii) 
decreasing savings rate and capital accumulation due to an increasing dependency ratio and the cost of 
prolonged care of the aged; (iii) decreasing investment into human capital of the young generation due to 
increasing social welfare costs; and (iv) increasing foreign debt due to falling interest rates. 
 
 In contrast, some scholars point to the possibility of positive effects of low population growth and 
population ageing on economic growth, such as development of labour-saving technology and increased 
investment in human capital. The latter is posited to compensate for the decline in economic growth 
arising from the quantitative decrease in labour input. Scarth (2002), for example, asserts that population 
ageing could lead to productivity growth by motivating increased investment in human capital as labour 
becomes a relatively scarce factor of production. In a cross-national comparative study using panel data, 
Cutler and others (1990) concluded that decreasing labour force growth results in increasing labour 
productivity.  
 
 Thus, one of the fundamental measures to counteract adverse effects of an ageing population and 
shrinking labour force will be improving the productivity of the labour force. If consistent growth in 
labour productivity and increasing labour force participation among women can be achieved in coming 
decades, then the negative effect of population ageing could be mitigated (Phang and others, 2004; Cho, 
2000).  
 
 The question is whether it is feasible to raise labour productivity to a level capable of compensating 
for the decreasing labour force, particularly after 2020. The prospect is rather discouraging. Long-term 
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projections in Korea usually predict labour productivity growth at around 0.2-0.4 per cent (Choi and 
others, 2003; Dae-Il Kim, 2004), a much lower level relative to the average 2.0-4.0 per cent during the 
last thirty years. According to Dae-Il Kim (2004), underlying the decline in future labour productivity is 
the changing population age structure and the decreasing quality of higher education. 
 
 In another study, Dong-Suk Kim (2004) simulated future economic growth (measured by the real 
GDP growth rate) using different assumptions about future fertility changes and total factor productivity. 
His projection is based on a Cobb-Douglas production function and takes into account long-term changes 
in savings and capital stock, an index of human capital and the size of the work force. Table  9 shows the 
predicted contribution of different factors to the economic growth rate based on the particular assumption 
that total fertility rate will recover to 1.4 and that total factor productivity will grow by 2 per cent 
annually. Overall, Korea’s economic growth rate is expected to remain around 5 per cent during the first 
two decades of this century, and then decrease to 3.5 per cent during the 2020s, 2.2 per cent during the 
2030s and 1.5 per cent during the 2040s.  
 
 In a similar vein, H. H. Lee (2001) has predicted that population ageing in Korea will result in a 
substantial decrease in future economic growth due to a lower savings rate and slower-to-negative labour 
force growth. He projects that the economic growth rate will fall from 8.8 per cent in 2000 to 4.1 per cent 
in 2010, 3.1 per cent in 2020, 2.2 per cent in 2030, 1.3 per cent in 2040, and 1.0 per cent in 2050. 
 
F. POPULATION AGEING AND INCREASING COST OF OLD-AGE INCOME SECURITY  
 
 The projected demographic transition to an aged society will have serious economic and social 
impacts. Among other things, it will create a severe strain on public finances. Health care and other social 
assistance expenditures are expected to rise significantly with the increasing number of older persons. 
However, the main component of the rise in public spending will be the increasing expenditure for old-
age pensions.  In 2000, public expenditure on old-age pensions in Korea was 2 per cent of GDP, the 
lowest among OECD countries, but between 2000 and 2050 Korea is expected to experience the greatest 
increase in pension expenditures (figure 10). The National Pension System in Korea is projected to 
accumulate a huge amount of hidden liability as it matures, which will be transferred to the next 
generation of workers.  This extra burden on the future workforce will also have a negative effect on the 
national economy during the next few decades. 
 
 In the Korean context of rapid population ageing and increasing costs of supporting the older 
population, the pension system is particularly important because of the scarcity of complementary 
programmes for old-age income security. For instance, Korea’s National Basic Livelihood Protection 
Programme is intended to provide social assistance to ensure a minimum income, but its coverage is 
limited. Employed workers can receive, as they leave the firm, a retirement allowance equivalent to one 
month’s salary for each year of service. However, this programme covers under 40 per cent of workers 
and, in general, the lump sum tends to be spent over the working life rather than being preserved until 
retirement age, because the work career of most Korean workers is characterized by multiple and 
relatively short-term jobs.  
 
 The rise in taxes and social security contributions that will be required to finance the increasing 
public expenditures associated with population ageing may give rise to intergenerational inequities and 
tensions. Much of this extra burden of taxation will fall on the working-age population who, at the same 
time, will lose political power in terms of votes to the growing number of older people. This may make it 
difficult for Korea to carry out the necessary adjustments to cope with an ageing society (OECD, 2002). 
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TABLE  9: ECONOMIC GROWTH RATE DISAGGREGGATED INTO SELECTED CONTRIBUTING FACTORS,  
REPUBLIC OF KOREA, 2000-2050 
 
Contributing factors 
Period 
Growth rate a 
(percentage) Work force b Human capital Capital stock 
Total factor 
productivity 
2000-2010 5.1 0.7 0.8 1.7 2.0 
2010-2020 4.8 0.3 0.6 1.9 2.0 
2020-2030 3.5 -0.4 0.5 1.4 2.0 
2030-2040 2.2 -0.9 0.3 0.8 2.0 
2040-2050 1.5 -1.0 0.1 0.4 2.0 
Source: Kim, Dong-Suk (2004). 
a Measured by real GDP growth rate. 
b Total fertility rate is assumed to increase to 1.4 by 2050. 
 
 
Figure 10. Public old-age pension expenditures (as percentage of GDP) in OECD countries, 2000-2050 
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Source: OECD (2001). 
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G. SOME POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
 
“More Children” policy 
 As previously discussed, fertility is the most critical demographic variable in determining future 
population and economic growth in Korea. The size and composition of the population and labour force, 
the status of the economy and future social well-being all depend on future fertility trends. It is thus 
understandable that the Government has implemented a pronatalist “More Children” policy, which has 
introduced new, or reinforced existing, “work-and-family-friendly” measures for working women 
(MOHW, 2004) and has started providing married couples with direct financial support in the form of tax 
breaks or cash allowances for each additional child. Underlying this policy initiative is a recognition of 
the high cost of rearing and educating children and the difficulty that married women with children 
confront in trying to combine work and family—the barriers being both institutional and cultural.  
  
 The current generation of young women seems already to have decided to pursue their work careers 
even if this entails delaying marriage and family formation. With effective means for controlling fertility 
readily available, couples can easily limit the number of children they have. On the other hand, in the 
Asian culture of family and kinship, remaining childless is still an unpopular option; one or two children 
is considered to be ideal. At the same time, with a still-ingrained preference for a son, Korean couples 
have successfully pursued parity-specific sex control for their additional children. The sex ratio for the 
third child was almost 180 boys per hundred girls in 1995 and 144 in 2000, whereas the ratios for the first 
and second child were 105 and 107, respectively (KNSO, 2003).  
 
 There are few who believe that the Government’s pronatalist campaign based on direct financial 
incentives will by itself have a sizeable impact on the demographic behaviour of the young generation. 
Rather, more fundamental reforms should be pursued on a long-term basis to lower the cost of rearing and 
educating children, to make more work opportunities available to married women with children, and to 
build up a social-institutional system free of gender discrimination. Sleebos (2003), on examining the 
effect of the pronatalist policies of many European countries, concluded that, while these policies are 
often very costly, they tend to fall short of affecting fertility behaviour to a significant degree. It may 
therefore be advisable for the Government of the Republic of Korea to invest more in the quality than in 
the quantity of children and the future labour force.  
 
Immigration policy 
 
 Another important policy for dealing with an ageing population and shortage of workers is to increase 
the working population through immigration (Visco, 2001). Most immigrant workers are relatively young, 
and immigrants often have higher fertility than that of the residents, so that immigration could also 
contribute to increasing fertility. Nevertheless, immigration cannot solve the problem of an ageing 
population and low population growth (Tapinos, 2000; United Nations, 2000, Choi and others, 2003). 
Apart from difficult issues of social integration and border control, the number of immigrants needed to 
compensate for the prospective decline in labour force would be huge, and the flow would need to be 
sustained in order to have a lasting effect on the age structure: immigrant workers get old too.  
Labour market and employment policy 
 The size of the Korean labour force in the future will depend not only on fertility but also on 
participation rates. In particular, the participation of older persons and women could be greatly influenced 
by institutional settings and policy initiatives. Even though labour force growth will turn negative after 
2020 in all of the OECD scenarios, the magnitude of the decline will be lower if there is a general rise in 
participation rates. For instance, under the baseline scenario, labour force growth over the period 2000-
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2020 is projected to average 0.8 per cent per year, down from 2.1 per cent per year during the two 
previous decades. If participation rates for the older population were to decline—in response, for 
example, to public pensions becoming more extensively available—then, all else constant, annual labour 
force growth over the period 2000-2020 would be even lower at only 0.5 per cent. Under the maximum 
scenario, the increase in labour force would be 1.4 per cent per year (OECD, 2002).  
 
 Policy should therefore aim to encourage participation and employment for the older work force 
(OECD, 2002). Up to now, participation rates of the older population, especially males, have been high in 
Korea. However, with limited employment opportunities in the formal sector and with the involuntary 
early retirement currently practiced in Korean firms, it might become increasingly difficult for older 
persons to find employment in the future. Rapid technological change and the demand for increased skills 
that will characterize the future labour market also could exacerbate the employment problem of older 
workers. Therefore, on the demand side, employment contracts including mandatory early retirement 
policies should be changed gradually to adjust to the ageing of population and of the labour force. On the 
supply side, workers’ initiative and choice should be directed toward lowering the cost of long-duration 
employment contracts, such as seniority wage and retirement allowance, so that long tenure (normal 
retirement) with a productivity-based wage system could gradually replace a system of short tenure (early 
retirement) and high wages (Phang, 2004).  
 
 Women’s labour force participation has been low in Korea relative to other advanced countries (see 
table 8), in particular for young women with higher education. In fact, women could be the most valuable 
resource for Korea’s future labour force. In this respect, the Government should strengthen its policy to 
assure that entry to the labour market following school-leaving, and re-entry to the labour market after 
childbearing, can be achieved at low transition costs. In addition, Korean labour market institutions and 
practices need to be reformed to enable working women to harmonize work and family and to enhance 
the development of their work careers. 
 
H.  FINAL REMARKS 
 
 The Korean economy and society have benefited from the demographic transition that produced a 
relatively young population and growing labour force during the second half of the twentieth century. The 
result was rapid and consistent economic growth and social development. The baby-boom generation 
born in the early stage of the demographic transition conferred a demographic dividend that helped drive 
the nation’s “miracle” economic development.  
 
 Social structural changes at the macro-level that accompany rapid economic development often 
induce radical changes in individuals’ demographic behaviour.  In Korea, there have been rapid changes 
in marriage and childbearing among the generations that followed the first baby-boom cohort. Recent 
cohorts are marrying much later and bearing fewer children. At the same time, the baby-boom generation 
that carried out the work of Korean economic development is getting older. These ongoing demographic 
changes are leading to a rapidly ageing population. Korea’s population and labour force are expected to 
continue growing during the first two decades of this century although at a much slower rate than before. 
By 2020, however, the large baby-boom cohort will be almost completely retired from the labour force 
and its smaller group of descendents will make up the core of the workforce.  
 
 In order to confront the social and economic challenges of an older population and an older labour 
force, it is advisable that the Government of the Republic of Korea pursue a wide range of policy reforms 
in a consistent and efficient manner. In particular, reforms should centre on labour market institutions and 
the social welfare system so that the Korean economy can continue on a path of sustainable growth. 
Currently, the labour market in Korea remains in a stagnant state under the long shadow of the economic 
crisis that affected several Asian countries in the late 1990s. As a consequence, employment opportunities 
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for older persons as well as for youth have been curtailed due to the structural-adjustment and lean-
management policies practised in many large organizations and firms. Thus, the Government of the 
Republic of Korea faces the need to redouble its effort to prepare for an older society while still 
recovering from the current economic recession.  Yet the task should not be deferred.  To quote Denton 
and Spencer (2003): “The ‘problems’ of an aging population, or ‘challenges’ if one prefers, are not going 
to go away in a few years, to be replaced by others. They will be with us for a long time. Short-term 
‘solutions’ should be suspect. Think long.” 
 
_______________ 
 
NOTES 
 
1  Before 1950, the total fertility rate in Korea was 6.4 in 1925-1930; 6.1 in 1930-1935; 6.2 in 1935-1940; 6.1 in 
1940-1945; and 6.0 in 1945-1950. 
 
2 The policy environment was fundamental for the realization of the demographic dividend by increasing 
flexibility in the labour market to allow the expansion of the labour force, creating adequate saving mechanisms and 
providing good health and high-quality education. 
 
_______________ 
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